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Abstract
Ambiguity preferences are important to explain human decision-making in many ar-
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nance. To measure individual ambiguity preferences, the ex-
perimental economics literature advocates using incentivized laboratory experiments.
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11 Introduction
In many circumstances of everyday life, people take decisions in uncertain environments. In
most situations, the probabilities of the possible outcomes are only vaguely known to decision
makers, if at all. Since the seminal works of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961), the absence of
precise information on probabilities is referred to as ambiguity, and has been recognized as a
form of uncertainty distinct from the standard notion of risk.
Preferences towards ambiguity { and ambiguity aversion in particular { have shown to be an
important determinant of individual decision-making.1 Incorporating ambiguity preferences in
economic models helps to explain a variety of phenomena in economics and nance that cannot
be attributed to risk aversion alone.2
Given the importance of ambiguity preferences for a wide range of decisions in everyday life,
it is important for empirical researchers to measure these preferences. The experimental eco-
nomics literature advocates measuring ambiguity preferences using decision tasks incentivised
with money in laboratory settings. However, these procedures are costly, time-consuming, and
often complex to implement.
The objective of this paper is to provide a tool to measure ambiguity preferences when carrying
out laboratory experiments is impractical, such as in large scale surveys or eld studies. We
develop an ambiguity preference survey module by combining hypothetical thought experiments
and attitudinal questions that can reliably predict ambiguity preferences. Individual ambiguity
preferences are measured using a standard, incentivised decision task following the experimen-
tal tradition. The hypothetical thought experiments are taken from the economics literature,
while the attitudinal questions are predominantly from the psychology literature on ambigu-
ity (in)tolerance. These measures operationalise the concept of ambiguity as vagueness about
outcome probabilities (typical in economics), as well as aversion to novelty, complexity and in-
solubility. Applying a rigorous selection procedure that considers all possible combinations of
thought experiments and attitudinal questions, this paper identies a concise set of predictors
that explain a large part of the variation in ambiguity preferences elicited experimentally.
The ambiguity preference survey module consists of ve survey items. The rst item is a hypo-
thetical, path-dependent thought experiment in the spirit of the original Ellsberg (1961) two-
1Empirical studies show that ambiguity aversion can explain, among others, patterns in stock market partic-
ipation (Bianchi and Tallon, 2018; Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker, 2016; Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell
and Peijnenburg, 2016) and health behaviours among adolescents (Sutter et al., 2013).
2For example, theoretical models show that ambiguity aversion can explain the lower than expected investment
in nancial markets (e.g. Dow and Werlang, 1992; Bossaerts et al., 2010) and real investment projects (e.g.
Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007), the economic evaluation of climate change (e.g. Weitzman, 2009), the equity premium
puzzle (e.g. Collard et al., 2018) or low reservation wages for job searchers (e.g. Nishimura and Ozaki, 2004).
2colour urn experiment. At the same time, this item is the best single predictor of ambiguity
preferences. Besides, the survey module includes four attitudinal questions. In addition, we also
propose a more parsimonious survey module that consists of a smaller subset of three items in
total, the thought experiment and two attitudinal questions. Yet, this smaller module comes at
the cost of a lower explanatory power. To make the ambiguity preference module easy to use in
practical applications, we also propose a ready-to-use ambiguity preference score that allows a
simple and quick assessment of ambiguity preferences once the survey data has been collected.
We test the validity of the ambiguity preference module using a variety of tests. First, we
examine how well the preference module can explain ambiguity preferences in-sample. Second,
we resort to a entirely dierent sample of subjects of similar size to test the predictive power
of the preference module out of sample. Finally, we use a test-retest procedure to establish a
benchmark against which the quality of the preference module can be compared. Taken together,
these tests show that the ambiguity preference module allows to reliably measuring ambiguity
preference for dierent samples of subjects.
This paper is related to several streams of literature. Most of all, the paper complements
a number of studies that propose survey modules to measure economic preferences without
relying on incentivized experiments. So far, this literature has focused on risk preferences,
impatience and trust, but has neglected ambiguity preferences. For example, Dohmen et al.
(2011) show that a self-reported willingness to take risks correlates with experimentally elicited
risk preferences. Questions of this type are now routinely used to measure risk preferences
in large surveys, including the German Socio-Economic Panel and other surveys (Guiso and
Jappelli, 2008; Vieider et al., 2015; Donkers et al., 2001).Similarly, time preferences are collected
in surveys using self-reported attitudes on impatience and hypothetical choice tasks of present
and future rewards (Cole et al., 2013; Bernard et al., 2014). Trust can be measured using
attitudinal trust questions, which has been shown to correlate with behaviour in trust games
(Fehr et al., 2003). Most closely related to this paper is a recent study by Falk et al. (2016) that
examines the ability of hypothetical decision tasks and survey questions to predict preferences
for risk, time discounting, altruism, trust, positive and negative reciprocity in incentivised tasks.
Similar to our paper, they propose a survey module to measure these six preferences. This
preference module is then used to measure economic preferences in 76 countries around the
globe (Falk et al., 2018).
Our paper complements these studies by providing a module for ambiguity preferences. The
ambiguity preference module allows researchers to extend empirical studies on ambiguity pref-
erences to large scale eld studies based on the general population. This is especially important
3in light of recent advances in theoretical models assuming ambiguity, whose predictions have
rarely been tested empirically.
Furthermore, by analysing the predictive power of the ambiguity preference module using out-
of-sample tests, this paper makes also a methodological contribution when designing preference
survey modules. While previous papers mainly concentrate on achieving a high explanatory
power of their preference modules in-sample, these modules are rarely tested on dierent, in-
dependent samples. By showing that our ambiguity preference module can reliably explain
ambiguity preferences for a dierent sample of similar size, we further substantiate the validity
of the preference module.
This paper is also related to some recent studies that measure ambiguity preferences in large
representative samples. In most of these studies, however, the ambiguity preference elicitation is
not experimentally validated. For example, Butler et al. (2014) and Bianchi and Tallon (2018)
assume that their non-incentivized Ellsberg-style thought experiments reveal true preferences.
In fact, by showing that these thought experiments are signicantly correlated to ambiguity
preferences obtained in incentivized decision tasks, our study gives empirical support to their
assumptions. A notable exception are the recent papers by Cohen et al. (2011), Dimmock et al.
(2015), Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2016) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg
and Wakker (2016) that measure ambiguity preferences for large samples of the population using
incentivized decision tasks. Yet, given the nancial and administrative costs, such large-scale
eld studies are likely to remain the exception rather than the rule.3
The remainder of the paper develops as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design
of this study, including a detailed description of the various measures of ambiguity preferences.
Next, section 3 presents the experimental results. The ambiguity preference module is derived
in section 4 together with a series of validity tests. Section 5 provides some discussion and
conclusions.
2 Experimental design
This section presents the research design, followed by a detailed description of the incentivized
tasks, hypothetical thought experiments and attitudinal questions to measure ambiguity and
risk preferences. Then we present the experimental procedure and provide a short description
of the participants.
3For example, the study by Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2016) paid USD 23,850 in real
incentives.
42.1 Research design
This study evaluates whether hypothetical thought experiments and attitudinal survey ques-
tions can oer a reliable alternative to measure individual ambiguity preferences as obtained in
incentivized laboratory decision tasks.
Our research design involves two parts. In the rst part, we measure each subject's ambiguity
preferences using a standard task with monetary rewards. Such incentives aim to ensure that
the subjects' choices reveal their true preferences. The preferences obtained from the incen-
tivized task form our experimental ambiguity preference benchmark. In the second part, we
measure the subjects' ambiguity preferences using hypothetical thought experiments and atti-
tudinal questions. Then we assess whether these measures of ambiguity preferences can reliably
predict the ambiguity preference benchmark.
It is well known that ambiguity preferences depend on many factors. For example, Curley and
Yates (1989) show that ambiguity preferences depend on the probability of the risky alternative
oered. When facing unlikely events, subjects tend to exhibit ambiguity-seeking preferences be-
cause of overweighing of low likelihood events.Furthermore, Cohen et al. (1987) show that ambi-
guity preferences are contingent on the outcome domain. When confronted with potential losses,
subjects are less ambiguity averse, or even show ambiguity-seeking preferences (Chakravarty and
Roy, 2009; Kocher et al., 2015). To minimize the impact of such factors, the incentivized task
and hypothetical thought experiments measure ambiguity preferences in the gain domain, using
non-extreme probability ranges.
This paper measures individual ambiguity preferences in the sense of the Ellsberg (1961) thought
experiment, dening ambiguity as the absence of information on exact probabilities. While there
are other sources of ambiguity (Fox and Tversky, 1995; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Baillon et al.,
2018), the ambiguity notion in the tradition of Ellsberg is the most important ambiguity concept
in the experimental and behavioural economics literature and the paper focuses on that concept.
By considering a large set of hypothetical thought experiments and attitudinal questions, our
research design allows to measure Ellsberg-type ambiguity preferences. However, it is less suited
to measure a separate aspect of decision-making under ambiguity: the tendency of subjective
overweighting (and underweighting) of extreme likelihood ambiguous events, known in the liter-
ature as a-insensitivity. This concerns the observed tendency for subjects to transform extreme
likelihoods towards un-extreme, mid-range, probabilities. The implication of a-insensitivity is
that it may lead subjects to exhibit more ambiguity-seeking behaviour for low-likelihood events
and more ambiguity-averse behaviour for high-likelihood events. While a-insensitivity is an im-
5portant issue, its separate measurement, in addition to ambiguity preferences, imposes the use
and selection of additional probability-based incentivized tasks and probability-based hypothet-
ical thought experiments for low, medium, high likelihood events.4 This would have signicantly
increased the number of probability-based tasks relative to the others and increased the duration
of the experiment. To avoid introducing an overly complicated design with many probability-
based tasks by construction, we use non-extreme probability ranges at the cost of being unable
to elicit a-insensitivity.5
2.2 Incentivized tasks
The literature has proposed many dierent designs to measure ambiguity preferences.6 We
rely on the well-established design to measure ambiguity preferences using binary choice lists
between risky and ambiguous lotteries. The lotteries are presented in the form of two-colour
urns, similar to Ellsberg (1961). Binary choice lists are considered easier to understand than the
BDM mechanism (Becker et al., 1964), and are thus likely to result in more precise estimates of
ambiguity preferences.
The ambiguity preference task presents subjects with a decision table with 11 choices between
drawing a ball from either a risky or an ambiguous urn. The composition and payo structure
of the ambiguous urn is identical in all 11 situations. In contrast, the expected payo of the
risky urn increases from one situation to the next. This change is induced by increasing the
probability of winning some prize, while leaving the potential prize constant. The task has
been implemented in student and non-student samples as early as by Lauriola and Levin (2001).
As Dimmock et al. (2015) show, this particular design allows measuring ambiguity preference
independent of the subject's utility function, and thus risk preferences. The point at which
subjects switch from preferring the ambiguous urn over the risky urn reveals their ambiguity
preferences.7
To verify that ambiguity preferences are distinct from risk preferences, we also include a task
to elicit risk preferences. We use a standard multiple choice list, taken from Chakravarty and
4One example is the design by Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2016) who use three sets of incentivized
dynamic choice tasks to elicit ambiguity preferences for three dierent levels of ambiguity. They show that
a-insensitivity is related to nancial behaviour.
5In our considerations, there was also a trade-o between the duration of the experiment (and the incentives
paid) and the number of participants our budget allowed.
6For a review, see Camerer and Weber (1992), Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2016), and Carbone et al.
(2017).
7We also considered measuring ambiguity preferences using a binary choice list where the expected payo of
the risky urn changes by monotonically decreasing its prize (but not its probability), see for example Chakravarty
and Roy (2009). However, in such a setting the switching point depends on the subjects' risk preferences. Although
it is possible to rst estimate risk preferences, such a procedure increases the overall measurement error of the
estimated ambiguity preferences.
6Roy (2009) that proved intelligible in the piloting phase. In this task, subjects are presented
a decision table with 10 choices between drawing a ball from a low-risk urn and high-risk urn.
As the list proceeds, the low-risk urn remains identical while the expected payo from the high-
risk urn increases monotonically. The point at which subjects switch from the low-risk urn to
the high-risk urn reveals information on subject risk preferences.Both tasks are reproduced in
appendix A.
2.3 Hypothetical thought experiments
Following Ellsberg (1961), the literature has proposed a large variety of hypothetical thought
experiments to measure ambiguity preferences. Non-incentivized elicitation methods have the
advantage of lower costs and reduced complexity, thereby reducing the time needed to measure
preferences. In this study, we implement two common thought experiments to measure ambiguity
preferences:8
i. The rst thought experiment replicates the seminal two-colour Ellsberg (1961) urn experi-
ment. Following Butler et al. (2014), subjects are oered ve answer possibilities to allow
dierentiating between dierent degrees of ambiguity preferences.
ii. Second, we design a dynamic version of the Ellsberg (1961) two-colour thought experiment.
Subjects are presented four (in some cases ve) sequential choices between drawing a a ball
from a risky or an ambiguous urn. Depending on prior choices, the composition of the risky
urn is made more or less attractive from one situation to the next, converging to a point of
(approximate) indierent between both urns. This gives a matching probability similar to
the incentivized ambiguity task.9
Appendix B presents the two thought experiments in detail.
2.4 Attitudinal survey questions
While using survey questions to measure risk preferences is common (Guiso and Paiella, 2008;
Dohmen et al., 2011), there is yet no study in economics that explicitly uses questionnaires to
measure ambiguity preferences. We hence resort to survey questions from validated self-reported
attitudinal scales in the psychology literature on ambiguity (in)tolerance. In these scales subjects
8Any incentivized task can be transformed into a non-incentivized task by removing the monetary incentives.
However, the complexity remains higher than in usual thought experiments.
9Similar path dependent designs are used in Baillon et al. (2012), Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015), Dimmock
et al. (2015) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2016).
7are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with a list of statements on a
scale from 1 to 7.
The concept of ambiguity (in)tolerance used in psychology is more general than in economics.
While it comprises the typical notion of aversion to vague outcome probabilities, the concept also
refers to aversion to novelty, complexity and insolubility (Budner, 1962). Aversion to situations
with unclear structure (e.g., where there is no clear solution) is an indication of aversion to
ambiguity. For example, the scales contain statements such as \Practically every problem has a
solution".
We implement the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale by Kirton (1981), one of the most widely used
and renowned scales on ambiguity attitudes in psychology.10 In addition, we include selected
items from more recent scales, like the Ambiguity Tolerance scales (Budner, 1962; Norton,
1975; McLain, 2009) and the Uncertainty Response Scale by Greco and Roger (2001) that
correspond to the notion of ambiguity as absence of exact probabilities used in the economics
literature. Since it has been argued that ambiguity attitudes are related to optimism and
pessimism (Chateauneuf et al., 2007) and self-esteem (Heath and Tversky, 1991), we include
attitudinal questions on optimism/pessimism from the Extended Life Orientation test by Chang
et al. (1997) and a self-esteem measure by Robins et al. (2001). Together with some own
additions, the survey questionnaire contains 46 attitudinal questions in total. The complete list
is included in Appendix C.
2.5 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted in May and October 2013 at Birkbeck College, University of
London. The laboratory sessions were implemented in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each session
consisted of four parts. The rst part included the attitudinal questionnaire as described in
section 2.4. The hypothetical thought experiments (see section 2.3) followed in part 2. The
third part included a standard demographic questionnaire. Finally, the last section consisted of
the incentivized tasks, see section 2.2. The rst task was the risk task, followed by ambiguity
task.
This particular sequence was chosen to reduce potential spill-over eects between the four parts.
More precisely, subjects' answers in one part might be inuenced by answers in previous parts,
for example in an attempt to be consistent.11 However, because of monetary incentives, we
10Kirton (1981) is widely used in empirical work in social psychology. For a review, see Furnham and Ribchester
(1995). The scale develops from earlier works by Budner (1962), Rydell and Rosen (1966) and Mac Donald Jr.
(1970).
11For example, individuals aim to be consistent in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Falk
8expected choices in the decision tasks to be uninuenced by non-incentivised thought experiments
and attitudinal questions. Hence, placing the incentivized decision tasks at the end minimises
potential spill-over eects across parts. In two pilot sessions we reversed the order to test for
order eects, and nd none.
In the ambiguity tasks, participants were asked to select the colour of the winning ball. This
ensures that subjects had no reason to believe that the experimenter had any strategic incentive
to manipulate the colour of the balls in the ambiguous urn (Chow and Sarin, 2002; Charness
et al., 2013).
The payment modality of the incentivised tasks was common knowledge. Subjects were informed
that one situation of each task would be randomly selected by the computer at the end of the
session. Then the computer would randomly draw one ball from the urn chosen. This procedure
ensures that subjects state their true preferences.12 Earnings from the tasks were calculated in
terms of points, and then converted at a rate of 2:1 into GBP. On average, subjects earned GBP
18.45, which includes a xed show-up fee of GBP 10.13 Earnings were paid in private at the end
of the sessions.
2.6 Participants
121 subjects participated in the study, all of them students of three University of London colleges.
The participants were recruited via electronic mail and announcements at the beginning of
graduate and undergraduate lectures of various study programmes. The sample contains 54
(45%) male and 67 (55%) female subjects, with an average age of about 26 years. The sample
of participants predominantly came from Birkbeck College (University of London) which has a
professional and international student population. This gives the sample more variability than
that usually observed in experimental subject pools of undergraduate students. For example,
almost a fth of the subject sample is older then 30. For the detailed sample statistics see the
online supplementary material.
and Zimmermann, 2017).
12In a recent paper, Bade (2015) presents some problems with this random incentive mechanism when subjects
are ambiguity averse. Yet, to our knowledge, the random incentive mechanism remains the best incentive scheme
to measure ambiguity preferences and common place in laboratory and eld studies.
13The lowest payment was GBP 10, the highest payment GBP 26. Since the sessions lasted for about 40
minutes, the payos are sizable.
93 Experimental results
3.1 Ambiguity task
Table 1 presents the subjects' choices between drawing a ball from the risky or the ambiguous
urn in the incentivized ambiguity task. In around 55% of the situations, subjects prefer drawing
a ball from the risky urn over drawing a ball from the ambiguous urn. In binary choice lists, a
typical strategy is a threshold strategy. Since the relative attractiveness of the lotteries changes
monotonically from situation to situation, many participants prefer one urn over the other up
to a switching point, from which they prefer the other urn. Since there is no chance of winning
anything in the risky urn (urn 1) in situation 0, the ambiguous urn (urn 2) is the natural
choice. However, as the probability of winning a prize in the risky urn increases, it becomes
more attractive.
Yet, subjects may switch from one choice to the other more than once. This behaviour is dicult
to reconcile with standard preference models under ambiguity. The percentage of subjects that
switch more than once is fairly small at around 4%, in line with the study on risk preferences
by Holt and Laury (2002).
The columns on the right of table 1 present the switching points of the subjects, i.e., the last
situation before a subject switches from the ambiguous urn (urn 2) to the risky urn (urn 1).
In case a subject exhibits multiple switching points, we follow Falk et al. (2016) and calculate
the subject's average switching point. Since multiple switching pointy may indicate a misappre-
hension of the task, we also present the switching points for the sample of consistent decision
makers.
3.2 Risk task
Table 2 summarizes the results from the risk task. In about 56% of the situations, subjects
prefer drawing a ball from the relatively safe urn over drawing a ball from the very risky urn.
Again, the large majority of subjects (95%) exhibits a threshold strategy. Since the expected
earnings of the risky urn are zero in situation 0, all subjects prefer the safe urn. As the relative
attractiveness of the risky lottery increases monotonically from situation to situation, many
subjects switch at some stage to the risky urn. In case a subject exhibits multiple switching
points, we again calculate the subject's average switching point. The two columns on the right
present the switching points for all decision makers and consistent decision makers separately.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of incentivized ambiguity task
Panel A: Choices and switching points
Risky choices Switching point Switching point
(consistent DMs)
Risky choices Obs. Fraction Switching point Obs. Fraction Switching point Obs. Fraction
0/11 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0%
1/11 0 0.0% 1 0 0.0% 1 0 0.0%
2/11 0 0.0% 2 2 1.7% 2 2 1.7%
3/11 0 0.0% 3 9 7.4% 3 8 6.9%
4/11 7 5.8% 4 28 23.1% 4 27 23.3%
5/11 26 21.5% 5 49 40.5% 5 48 41.4%
6/11 50 41.3% 6 25 21.5% 6 25 21.6%
7/11 28 23.1% 7 6 5.0% 7 6 5.2%
8/11 8 6.6% 8 1 0.8% 8 0 0.0%
9 /11 2 1.7% 9 0 0.0% 9 0 0.0%
10/11 0 0.0% 10 0 0.0% 10 0 0.0%
11/11 0 0.0% 11 0 0.0% 11 0 0.0%
Total 121 100.0% Total 121 100.0% Total 116 100.0%
Panel B: Summary statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Lowest Highest
Risky choices 121 55.3% 0.10% 36.4% 81.8%
Switching point 121 4.91 1.08 2 8
Switching point (consistent DMs) 116 4.90 1.04 2 7
The table summarizes the results of incentivized ambiguity task. In panel A, the three columns
on the left report the number of situations subjects preferred drawing a ball from the risky urn
(urn 1) over drawing a ball from the ambiguous urn (urn 2). The columns on the right report the
switching points of the subjects. More precisely, it indicates the last situation before a subject
switches from the ambiguous urn (urn 2) to the risky urn (urn 1). 5 subjects exhibit multiple
switching points, i.e., they display inconsistent choices. In this case, we calculate the average
switching point. The three columns on the right exclude these inconsistent decision makers.
Panel B presents the summary statistics of the fraction of risky choices and the switching points.
For a detailed description of the task, see appendix A.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of incentivized risk task
Panel A: Choices and switching points
Choices Switching point Switching point
(consistent DMs)
Safe choices Obs. Fraction Switching point Obs. Fraction Switching point Obs. Fraction
0/10 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0%
1/10 1 0.8% 1 1 0.8% 1 1 0.8%
2/10 1 0.8% 2 1 0.8% 2 1 0.8%
3/10 4 3.3% 3 4 3.3% 3 4 3.5%
4/10 23 19.0% 4 23 19.0% 4 23 20.0%
5/10 36 29.8% 5 37 30.6% 5 34 29.6%
6/10 22 18.2% 6 21 17.4% 6 19 16.5%
7/10 18 14.9% 7 18 14.9% 7 18 15.7%
8/10 10 8.3% 8 10 8.3% 8 9 7.8%
9/10 2 1.7% 9 2 1.7% 9 2 1.7%
10/10 4 3.3% 10 4 3.3% 10 4 3.5%
Total 121 100.0% Total 121 100.0% Total 115 100.0%
Panel B: Summary statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Lowest Highest
Save choices 121 56.4% 0.17% 10% 100%
Switching point 121 5.64 1.66 1 10
Switching point 115 5.63 1.68 1 10
The table summarizes the results of incentivized risk task. In panel A, the three columns on the
left report the number of situations subjects preferred drawing a ball from the save urn (urn A)
over drawing a ball from the risky urn (urn B). The columns on the right report the switching
points of the subjects. More precisely, it indicates the last situation before a subject switched
from the safe urn (urn A) to the risky urn (urn B). 6 subjects exhibit multiple switching points,
i.e., they display inconsistent choices. In this case, we calculate the average switching point.
The three columns on the right exclude these inconsistent decision makers. A switching point of
0 means that the subject always preferred the risky urn; a switching point of 10 means that the
subject always preferred the safe urn. Panel B presents the summary statistics of the fraction
of safe choices and the switching points. For a detailed description of the task, see appendix A.
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3.3 Ambiguity preference benchmark
This section derives the experimental ambiguity preference benchmark from the switching points
of the incentivized ambiguity task. Following Dimmock et al. (2015), we use the subject's
so-called matching probability (or risk equivalent) as ambiguity preference benchmark. The
matching probability m is dened as the subjective probability at which a subject is indierent
between a risky and the ambiguous lottery. If m < 0:5, a subject is ambiguity-averse; if m > 0:5
a subject is ambiguity-seeking.14
We construct a subject's matching probability from the switching point in the incentivized
ambiguity task. Since the probability of winning a prize in the risky urn increases in 10%
steps, the task does not allow to determine a subject's exact matching probability, but only
up to intervals of 10%. We therefore dene the matching probability as the mid-point of these
intervals. For example, if a subject's switching point is 5 (i.e., preferring urn 2 up to situation
5 and then switching to urn 1), then the matching probability is between 50% and 60%. We
therefore assign a matching probability of 55%.
Panel A of table 3 presents the summary statistics of the preference benchmark for the entire
sample and the sample of consistent subjects. The average matching probability is around 0.44,
which corresponds to ambiguity-averse preferences, on average.15
Panel B presents the distribution of ambiguity preferences when classifying subjects in two or
three ambiguity preference groups. The upper row uses a binary classication that distinguishes
between ambiguity seeking (m > 0:5) and ambiguity averse decision makers (m < 0:5). The
lower row presents the results based on a classication into three groups, including ambiguity
neutrality, where ambiguity neutrality is dened as m 2 [0:45; 0:55].16 The benchmark classies
73% of subjects as ambiguity averse using a binary segmentation of preferences. However, a
classication in three preference categories shows that almost two thirds of the sample can be
considered ambiguity neutral.
Panel C presents the Spearman rank correlation between ambiguity preference benchmark and
several socio-economic characteristics. Similar to Binmore et al. (2012) and Dimmock et al.
(2015), we do not nd any gender dierences in ambiguity preferences, neither an eect of
14Because of symmetry of the two colours and an implicitly assumed exchangeability condition (Chew and
Sagi, 2006), a matching probability of 0.5 is the subjective probability of an ambiguity-neutral decision maker.
From this, it follows that a matching probability larger than 0.5 corresponds to ambiguity seeking preferences,
and that a matching probability smaller than 0.5 corresponds to ambiguity averse preferences. See Dimmock et al.
(2015) for a theoretical derivation.
15This is similar to Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2016) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and
Peijnenburg (2016), which document an average matching probability of 0.40 and 0.48, respectively.
16If a subject is ambiguity neutral (m = 0:5), then he is indierent between switching after situation 4 or 5,
which correspond to an estimated matching probability of 0.45 or 0.55.
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Table 3: Ambiguity preference benchmark
Panel A: Ambiguity preference benchmark (m)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All subjects 121 0.441 0.108 0.15 0.75
Only consistent DMs 116 0.440 0.104 0.15 0.65
Panel B: Distribution of ambiguity preferences
Groups Ambiguity Ambiguity Ambiguity
seeking neutral averse
All subjects 2 27% { 73%
3 6% 62% 32%
Only consistent DMs 2 27% { 73%
3 5% 63% 32%
Panel C: Correlation between benchmark, socio-demographic characteristics and risk preferences
Rank correlation p-value
Female  0:052 0.568
Age 0:078 0.396
Education of mother 0:003 0.973
Risk aversion 0:070 0.448
The table presents the ambiguity preferences of the incentivized task as measured by the subject's
matching probability m (or risk equivalent). Panel A reports the descriptive statistics. Panel B
describes the distribution of ambiguity preferences when classifying subjects in two or three am-
biguity preference groups. The upper row uses a binary classication that distinguishes between
ambiguity seeking (m > 0:5) and ambiguity averse decision makers (m < 0:5). The lower row
presents the results based on a classication into three groups, including ambiguity neutrality,
where ambiguity neutrality is dened as m 2 [0:45; 0:55]. Panel C presents the Spearman rank
correlation between the ambiguity preference benchmark, selected socio-economic characteristics
and an experimental measure of risk aversion. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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the educational background or age. Finally, we replicate the standard result that ambiguity
preferences are distinct from risk preferences.
3.4 Thought experiments
Table 4 analyses the results from the two thought experiments. Panel A shows that in the
Ellsberg (1961) thought experiment with ve answer possibilities, 64% of subjects are ambi-
guity averse, 28% are ambiguity seeking and 8% ambiguity neutral. In the dynamic Ellsberg
urn experiment, we transform the subjects' choices into a matching probability, similar to the
incentivized ambiguity task. More precisely, after the last choice, a subject's matching proba-
bility is narrowed down to a small interval. As before, we dene the matching probability as the
mid-point of that interval. Panel B shows that the average matching probability is 44%. This
is remarkably similar to the ambiguity preference benchmark, and consistent with the notion of
ambiguity aversion.17
Panel C presents the distribution of subjects into two or three broad ambiguity preference
groups, similar to panel B of table 3. Yet, since Ellsberg thought experiment explicitly allows
for ambiguity neutrality, it is not possible to apply a binary classication for this elicitation
method. When using a binary classication, most subjects are ambiguity averse. However,
similar to the incentivized task, there is a substantial fraction of ambiguity-neutral decision
makers.
Panels D and E compare the ambiguity preferences obtained from the thought experiments
to the benchmark. With 27%, the dynamic Ellsberg urn exhibits the highest rank correlation
with the benchmark. The classic Ellsberg urn experiment correlates to 19% with the ambiguity
preference benchmark. This lower correlation is likely to result from the signicantly fewer
answer possibilities, and hence cross-sectional variation, in this thought experiment.
17In both thought experiments, the majority of subjects is ambiguity averse (p < 0:01, binomial probability
test).
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Table 4: Non-incentivized thought experiments
Panel A: Ellsberg (1961) urn
Observations Fraction
Strong preference for ambiguous urn 12 9.9%
Slight preference for ambiguous urn 22 18.2%
Indierent between both urns 10 8.3%
Slight preference for risky urn 40 33.1%
Strong preference for risky urn 37 30.6%
Total 121 100.0%
Panel B: Dynamic Ellsberg urn
Matching probability Observations Fraction
2.5% 1 0.8%
12.5% 4 3.3%
22.5% 5 4.1%
27.5% 5 4.1%
32.5% 11 9.1%
37.5% 25 20.7%
42.5% 6 5.0%
47.5% 20 16.5%
52.5% 27 22.3%
57.5% 10 8.3%
62.5% 1 0.8%
67.5% 2 1.7%
72.5% 2 1.7%
77.5% 1 0.8%
95% 1 0.8%
Total 121 100.0%
Mean Standard deviation
Matching probability 43.9% 13.8%
Panel C: Distribution of ambiguity preferences
Elicitation method Groups Ambiguity Ambiguity Ambiguity
seeking neutral averse
Ellsberg (1961) urn 2 { { {
3 28% 8% 64%
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 2 36% { 64%
3 14% 39% 47%
Panel D: Correlation between ambiguity preferences and non-incentivized tasks
Elicitation method Rank correlation p-value
Ellsberg (1961) urn 0:186 0.041
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 0:268 0.003
Panel E: Individual consistency of ambiguity preferences and non-incentivized tasks
Elicitation method Consistent Dierence to Test of
preferences independent distribution association
Ellsberg (1961) urn 35% 7:45%
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 53% 12:8% ***
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Annotation to table 4
The table summarizes the results of the two non-incentivized thought experiments. Panels A and
B present the descriptive statistics. Panel C describes the distribution of ambiguity preferences
when classifying subjects in two/three broad ambiguity preference groups, similar to table 3.
Since the Ellsberg thought experiment explicitly allows for ambiguity neutrality, it has been
excluded from from the binary classication. Panel D presents the Spearman rank correlation
between the ambiguity preference benchmark and the ambiguity preferences obtained from the
non-incentivized tasks. Panel E reports the individual consistency of the estimated ambiguity
preferences when classifying subjects into three broad ambiguity preferences groups. The rst
column presents the fraction of individually consistent preferences, i.e., subjects that exhibit the
same ambiguity attitude in the thought experiments and the ambiguity preference benchmark.
The second column presents the dierence of the observed consistency compared to the fraction
of individually consistent preferences that one would observe if the ambiguity measures were
independently distributed. The last column shows the statistical signicance of a two-sided
Fisher test of association between each pair of ambiguity preferences. For a detailed description
of the thought experiments, see appendix B.
Panel E presents an analysis of the subjects' within-person consistency of the ambiguity pref-
erences obtained from the two thought experiments relative to the ambiguity preference bench-
mark. More precisely, the panel presents the fraction of subjects that exhibit the same ambiguity
attitude in the thought experiments as in the ambiguity preference benchmark. This analysis
shows that the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment performs rather well in classifying subjects
similar to the benchmark (53% of the subjects), which is signicantly higher than the fraction
of consistent preferences one would observe if the preferences were independently distributed.
4 Ambiguity preference module
This section examines whether thought experiments and attitudinal questions can be used to pre-
dict ambiguity preferences. We identify a set of thought experiments and attitudinal questions
that best predict the ambiguity preference benchmark (section 4.1) and propose an ambiguity
preference survey module that reliably measures ambiguity preferences when laboratory exper-
iments are not feasible (section 4.2). We then test the validity of the module (section 4.3) and
propose a ready to use ambiguity preference module for applied work (section 4.4).
4.1 Item selection procedure
The construction of the ambiguity preference survey module faces the challenge of nding the
optimal trade-o between parsimony and a suciently high explanatory power of ambiguity
preferences. To determine the items that best proxy for ambiguity preferences, we follow a
procedure inspired by Falk et al. (2016). The rational of this procedure is to make as fewer
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a-priori assumptions as possible in regards to the item selection and let the selection be data
driven.
This procedure consists of two steps. First, for a given number of predictors, we estimate
linear regression models for all possible combinations of predictors. Considering all possible
combinations of thought experiments and attitudinal questions on equal basis avoids imposing
arbitrary selections and takes into account all possible correlation patterns among the predictors.
Then we select the set of predictors that maximize the explained variation of the ambiguity
preference benchmark, i.e. the R2. Evaluating the predictive power for a given number of
predictors is useful for practical purposes since survey data collection often imposes space and
time constraints. In the second step, we use standard information criteria to select the best
specication out of the models chosen in the rst step. In an attempt to avoid over-tting
the data and identifying a concise preference module, we resort to the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC), since it contains a larger penalty for additional explanatory variables relative
to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the adjusted R2.18
4.2 The ambiguity preference module
Table 5 presents the selected items for a given number of predictors up to the specication
with the lowest overall BIC. Panel A reports the regressions when using all decision makers;
panel B reports the regressions when considering the subset of consistent decision makers only.
Predictors measured on Likert scales (e.g., survey questions) are coded as binary indicators
(equal to 1 if the response value indicates agreement with an ambiguity tolerant statement and
equal to 0 otherwise), using the median respondent value in the sample as the threshold for the
classication. The estimated coecients on the binary indicators (multiplied by 100) estimate
the dierential in terms of risk equivalent (i.e. percentage point dierential) between ambiguity
tolerant and ambiguity averse people.19 Predictors measured as continuous variables are treated
18The choice set of alternative item selection procedures is vast. Alternatives vary along the dimensions of i) the
selection procedure; ii) the goodness of t statistics used; iii) the specication used in the iteration. Alternative
selection procedures in (i) include stepwise forward selection, stepwise backward selection, or the Lasso technique
by Tibshirani (1996). Each of these techniques has considerable drawbacks that make them unsuitable for our
purpose. For a critical discussion on these alternative selection procedures see Falk et al. (2016), footnote 13.
Alternatives in (ii) include the BIC (which we use), the adjusted R2, AIC or the Mean Squared Error. These
statistics apply dierent penalties for the estimation of additional parameters. Alternatives in (iii) include non-
linear functional forms.
19In order to classify responses into binary indicators (i.e. ambiguity tolerant/intolerant), we use the sample
median value for each survey question to take into account the distribution of sample responses. Some of the survey
question responses have skewed distributions. This is likely to be due to the composition of our subject sample:
students. For example, the majority of young people agree to the statement \I would like to live in a foreign
country new to me." While the use of the sample median is not indispensable, it creates relative classications
within sample.
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as continuous variables.20 Column (1) of Table 5 shows the best predictor (in terms of R2) when
using one predictor; column (2) shows the two best predictors when using two predictors, and
so on.
For both samples, the best single predictor is the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment, which
alone explains about 5% of the variation in the ambiguity preference benchmark. In fact, this
hypothetical thought experiment is very similar in spirit to the hypothetical thought experiment
used to measure risk preferences in the streamlined version of the preference module by Falk
et al. (2016).
When using the entire sample of 121 subjects (panel A), the best specication in terms of BIC
contains ve explanatory variables, including the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment and four
survey questions. Together, these items explain about 21% of the variation in ambiguity prefer-
ences. When restricting to the sample of 116 consistent subjects (panel B), the best specication
(in terms of BIC) includes three predictors, the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment and two
survey questions, a subset of the items selected of the entire data sample. These three predictors
achieve an R2 of about 12%. The explanatory power of both sets of models is comparable to
those of risk preferences reported by Falk et al. (2016).
Table 6 presents the exact wording of the ambiguity preference modules for both samples.21
It makes sense that the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment is the best single-item predictor
of ambiguity preferences: it has a similar framing as the incentivised task and by producing
a ner measurement classication, it provides more explanatory power than qualitative tasks
with coarser classications. In terms of the attitudinal questions, survey items 1 and 2 are part
of the Kirton (1981) Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. Survey items 35 and 41 are taken from
the uncertainty response scale by Greco and Roger (2001) and the ambiguity tolerance scale II
(McLain, 2009). The former two survey items capture the aversion to complexity and unclear
20Two alternative specications are possible. A more exible approach would be to implement a fully non-
parametric specication with a binary indicator for each value of the rating scales (=1 if that value is chosen, =0
otherwise). The advantage of this approach is to allow for a exible, non-linear, pattern of predictors' correlations
with the ambiguity benchmark. As we measured the survey item predictors on 7-point Likert scales, this approach
would imply estimating 6 parameters for each ordinal predictor. Given our sample size, such an approach would
be inappropriate as we would run out of degrees of freedom quickly. However, the fully non-parametric approach
would be advisable for future studies with larger samples. A second alternative approach is to treat rating scales
as continuous variables. This approach relies on the assumption of linearity, which may, but need not, be satised.
As a robustness test, we run auxiliary regressions to test the linearity assumption in our sample and we conclude
that the linearity assumption cannot be rejected for the items selected. These tests are available in the online
supplementary material.
21This result shows that the dynamic Ellsberg though experiment is a better predictor relative to the static
two-colour Ellsberg thought experiment. This does not mean that the Ellsberg thought experiment is not a good
proxy, but that the dynamic Ellsberg though experiment explains more variation in the benchmark. Indeed, the
static Ellsberg thought experiment is signicantly correlated with ambiguity preferences in pairwise tests (see
table 4). This provides a validation to existing applications of the static Ellsberg thought experiment, e.g., Butler
et al. (2014).
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Table 5: Predicting the ambiguity preference benchmark
Panel A: All subjects
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
best
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Item 19 -0.0392**
(0.019)
Item 1 0.0501** 0.0545*** 0.0485**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Item 2 0.0501** 0.0524*** 0.0488**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Item 35 0.0276 0.0402*
(0.021) (0.021)
Item 41 -0.0425**
(0.020)
constant 0.3655*** 0.3883*** 0.3099*** 0.2883*** 0.2993***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.039)
BIC from selection procedure  192:54  192:05  195:26  194:66  195:91
R2 from selection procedure 4.8% 8.1% 14.0% 16.9% 20.9%
Observations 121 121 121 121 121
Panel B: Consistent subjects
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
best
Item 19 -0.0391** -0.0398**
(0.019) (0.019)
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 0.0015** 0.0016**
(0.001) (0.001)
Item 1 0.0387*
(0.020)
Item 2 0.0520***
(0.020)
constant 0.4622*** 0.3969*** 0.3269***
(0.015) (0.033) (0.036)
BIC from selection procedure  191:64  191:46  192:31
R2 from selection procedure 3.8% 7.6% 11.9%
Observations 116 116 116
The table presents regressions of the ambiguity preference benchmark (m) on the preferences
obtained from non-incentivized thought experiments and the attitudinal questions. In section
4.1, we estimate linear regression models for all possible combinations of predictors. The table
above reports the specications with the highest adjusted R2 for a given number of predictors up
to the specication with the lowest overall BIC (the optimal specication). BIC and R2 statistics
of these specications are reported in the bottom rows of each panel. Predictors measured on
Likert scales (i.e., the survey questions, indicated with the term `item' in Table 4.1) are coded
as binary indicators (equal to 1 if the response value indicates agreement with an ambiguity
tolerant statement and equal to 0 otherwise), using the median respondent value in the sample
as the threshold for the classication. Panel A reports the regressions when using all decision
makers; panel B reports the regressions when only considering consistent decision makers. T-
statistics are given in the parenthesis below the estimated coecients. *, **, and *** denote
statistical signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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structure, the latter two statements capture the aversion to uncertain outcomes.
By having identied that a dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment is a good predictor of ambi-
guity preferences, the module gives condence in the measurement validity of probability-based
thought experiments with medium range probabilities. Further research may build on this result
and introduce variations in the levels of ambiguity to measure secondary elements of ambiguity
attitudes, like a-insensitivity, in large surveys.
4.3 Tests of the ambiguity preference module
4.3.1 In-sample tests
As a rst assessment of the quality of the ambiguity preference module, we analyse the module's
in-sample t, i.e., the degree to which the module captures the variation in ambiguity preferences.
To this end, we calculate the in-sample correlation between the predicted ambiguity preferences
using the preference module and the ambiguity preference benchmark. The predicted ambiguity
preferences are calculated as the tted values of the regressions. Depending on the length of the
preference module, the correlations range between 22% for the single-item module up to 41%
for the 5-predictor module, see the second column of table 6. These correlations are sizable, and
highly signicant. They are also comparable to the magnitudes found in similar studies on risk
preferences (Falk et al., 2016).
4.3.2 Out-of-sample tests
While the in-sample t is an important criterion to assess a module's ability to capture the
subjects' preferences, it is not free from limitations. Most important, adding more predictors
to the module always improves the explanatory power in-sample, but can worsen the module's
ability to predict preferences for another subject pool (over tting). Hence, a more important
test of any preference module is not the in-sample t, but its accuracy in predicting preferences
out of sample.
To analyse the predictive power of the ambiguity preference module out of sample, we replicate
the incentivized tasks and the entire ambiguity preference module on a completely dierent pool
of subjects. This second round of experiments was conducted in March 2016 at the ExpReSS
Lab at Royal Holloway, University of London.22 We call this the second sample.
With 99 subjects, the second sample is almost of equal size as the original data sample. Relative
to the original sample, the average age of participants is signicantly younger (18.3 years) and
22The experimental procedure of this second round of experiments is identical those described in section 2.
22
has larger fraction of female participants (75%). The diversity in subject characteristics makes
the out-of-sample results even a stricter test.
The procedure of the out-of-sample test is as follows. First, we predict ambiguity preferences
of the second sample of subjects using their answers to the items included in the preference
modules identied in the item selection procedure (and listed in Panel A and B in table 6). We
use the coecient estimates in Table 5 to predict second sample subjects' ambiguity preference.
Then, we correlate the predicted ambiguity preferences with the actual ambiguity preference
benchmark elicited for the second sample of subjects.
The results are presented in the right column of table 6. Depending on the module, the out-of-
sample correlations between predicted and actual ambiguity preferences are between 26% and
33%, and in most cases highly signicant. Again, these correlations are comparable to those of
risk preferences in Falk et al. (2016).
With the exception of the single-item module, the out-of-sample correlation is lower than the in-
sample correlation. This is expected, since the module coecients are obtained from a completely
dierent data set. Yet, the dynamic Ellsberg urn thought experiment is even better in predicting
ambiguity preferences out-of-sample than in-sample. This further underlines the reliability of
this module item in measuring ambiguity preferences.
4.3.3 Test-retest
The in-sample and out-of-sample correlations are statistically signicant. However, to judge
whether their magnitudes are sizeable and relevant in economic terms, one needs a benchmark
correlation (i.e. the maximum correlation that can be achieved). It is not reasonable to expect a
100% correlation between ambiguity preferences and the preference module because any measure
of preferences has in practice some unavoidable measurement error.This implies that even if the
module measured ambiguity preferences equally well as the incentivized task, the correlation will
be less than one because of measurement errors. What correlation can one reasonably expect?
A reasonable benchmark is the one oered by a test-retest procedure, also adopted in Falk
et al. (2016): let the same subject answer the same task twice. The benchmark correlation is
the level of correlation between the rst and second answer. The underlying idea is that when
measuring ambiguity preferences for the same subject twice, one should obtain the maximum
level of achievable correlation netted by the measurement error. This correlation is going to be
a reasonable benchmark against which to assess in-sample and out-of-sample correlations.
We implement the test-retest procedure on the incentivized tasks using a sub-sample of 26
subjects who participated in the study twice, with a time lag of 5 months. This gives us two
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measures of ambiguity preferences elicited in an identical way. The test-retest correlation is
obtained by correlating the rst observation of the subjects' ambiguity preference benchmark
with their second observation.
The test-retest correlation is 32.9%, with a p-value of 0.101, i.e., close to signicant at the 10%
level. The rank correlation is 38.6%, with a p-value of 0.059. This correlation is comparable
to the test-retest of risk preferences in Falk et al. (2016). More importantly, the test-retest
correlation is close to the in-sample and out-of-sample correlation between preference benchmark
and ambiguity preference module (see table 6). Hence, the ambiguity preference module can be
considered suciently reliable.
4.4 Ambiguity preference score
The ambiguity preference module is easily implementable in all kinds of surveys, including phone-
based surveys. Answering the preference module takes less than 5 minutes. In this section, we
give two suggestions to create a ready-to-use ambiguity preference score from the responses to
the module for empirical applications. The section assumes that a researcher collects responses
using the `best' version of the module as presented in column (5) of table 5, Panel A, and wants
to combine the data in some ways to obtain a unied score (or index) of ambiguity preferences
without having access to incentivized preference measures.
There are several ways to combine the survey module responses. The main challenge is to convert
the survey questions (measured on Likert scales) into a unit of measurement comparable to the
dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment, such that they can be aggregated. One way to do that
is to use the coecients in Table 5 (Panel A) to construct this conversion metrics. Note that
the coecients associated with the survey questions are similar: they indicate, on average, a
dierential in ambiguity preferences of 0.045 based on the answers to the survey questions. This
dierential can be made comparable to a one unit change in the dynamic Ellsberg (one percentage
point) by dividing this number by the coecient of the Ellsberg thought experiment. The same
applies to the constant. The resulting equivalence for each survey question is 20 units (rounded
at the next integer) and 130 for the constant. Thus, if a subject is classied as ambiguity tolerant
based on a survey question, she receives 20 points, according to the sign of the coecient in
Table 5, 130 for the constant and the numerical value of her answer to the Ellsberg thought
experiment (in percent).23 A low ambiguity preference score corresponds to ambiguity-averse
preferences; a high ambiguity score corresponds to ambiguity-seeking preferences.
23As an example, suppose a subject reveals in the dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment a matching probability of
37.5% and answers all 4 survey questions with values revealing ambiguity tolerant attitudes. Then the ambiguity
preference score equals 37.5 +20 +20 +20 - 20 + 130 = 207.5.
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We want to point out that these estimates are based on the median responses of our sample
and we should not ignore the possibility that dierent samples behave dierently. One way
to standardize the conversion is to attribute an equivalence to each value of the Likert scale.
This method yields a score that has the advantage of being median response-invariant and
comparable across dierent samples. To calculate this equivalence, we recover the coecients
associated with one unit change in the Likert scales by re-running the regression specication
(5) in Table 5 Panel A treating the answers to the Likert scales as continuous variable. This
approach also allows for more variation in ambiguity preferences across subjects. The average
absolute value of the coecients of the survey questions is 0.01767 and the constant is 0.350.
Dividing these numbers by the coecient of the Ellsberg thought experiment (0.0027) yields an
equivalence of 7 points for each value of the Likert scale (and 130 for the constant). Again, a
low ambiguity preference score corresponds to ambiguity-averse preferences; a high ambiguity
score corresponds to ambiguity-seeking preferences. An ambiguity score of 292 corresponds to
ambiguity neutrality. Table 7 presents the ambiguity module together with this conversion rule.
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics of the so-obtained ambiguity preference scores for both
samples of subjects.
Panel A shows that the average and standard deviation of ambiguity preference score are similar
in both data samples: the average is around 262 points, with a standard deviation of about 19.
Panel B examines the correlations of the ambiguity preference score with the ambiguity prefer-
ence benchmark and self-reported risk preferences using a single-item survey question following
Dohmen et al. (2011), controlling for age and gender. The self-reported risk preferences is avail-
able only in the follow up dataset. As expected, the in-sample correlation with the ambiguity
preference benchmark is substantial, and very close to the correlations between the tted values
and the ambiguity preference benchmark, see table 6. Again, the out-of-sample correlation in
the second sample is smaller in magnitude but still strongly signicant. Finally, table 8 shows
that, as expected, the ambiguity preference score is not capturing self-reported risk preferences
following Dohmen et al. (2011). This is in line with the theoretical prediction that risk and
ambiguity preferences are not correlated, and give condence that, empirically, the ambiguity
score is not picking up elements of risk preferences.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposes a novel and experimentally validated ambiguity preference module to mea-
sure individual ambiguity preferences. We use responses to a variety of thought experiments
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Table 8: Ambiguity preference score
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) ambiguity preference score
Data set Original sample Second sample
`best' module 262.74 (19.8) 269.51 (19.3)
Panel B: Correlations
Data set Original sample Second sample
Ambiguity preference benchmark 80.7094*** 52.7275***
(14.897) (16.865)
Age -0.0738 -0.2612
(0.200) (0.760)
Female -2.9476 5.6460
(3.233) (3.674)
Risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011) -1.3995
(0.880)
constant 233.6830*** 249.2658***
(10.659) (18.189)
R2 0.204 0.115
N 121 99
Panel A reports the average and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the ambiguity preference
scores. Panel B reports the correlation of the ambiguity preference score with the ambiguity
preference benchmark and the risk preferences measured following Dohmen et al. (2011). P-
values are given in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
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and attitudinal survey questions to predict individual ambiguity preferences obtained from a
state-of-the-art incentivized experimental task. Applying an iterative selection procedure that
considers all possible combinations of predictors, the paper identies one thought experiment
and four attitudinal questions that are best in predicting ambiguity preferences. This set forms
our ambiguity preference module.
The ambiguity preference module passes a number of validation tests, including in-sample and
out-of-sample tests using two completely dierent subject pools. Taken together, these tests
show that the ambiguity preference module allows to reliably measure ambiguity preference
for dierent samples of subjects. The ambiguity preference module thus combines the rigour
of laboratory experiments with the convenience of survey questionnaires. It is simple, easy to
implement, and cost-eective. It can be used to reliably measure ambiguity preferences when
conducting incentivized laboratory experiments is infeasible. It therefore can be a valuable
tool for empirical researchers interested in measuring ambiguity preferences when conducting
large scale surveys or eld studies, where it is often impractical to use incentivized decision
tasks. The preference module might also be useful to experimental researchers with time and
money constraints, who seek to include a simple control measure of ambiguity preferences in
experimental studies.
By experimentally validating an ambiguity preference module to measure ambiguity preferences,
these results give some condence in the ability to elicit ambiguity preferences more widely
and consistently. A validated and widely applicable measurement tool to quantify ambiguity
preferences is an important and useful contribution to the literature because it may increase the
comparability across future studies, thus improving our understanding of the eects of ambiguity
preferences on economic behavior.
Finally, the ambiguity preference module may have direct practical applications, for example,
in the nancial service industry. While it is standard to use simple questionnaires to assess the
clients' risk preferences, ambiguity preferences have been left unexplored because of the lack of
simple assessment methods. By using the ambiguity preference module, private banks could
improve the personality assessment of their clients to tailor better asset allocation strategies.
We do not want to claim that, in order to measure ambiguity preferences, the ambiguity pref-
erence module is always preferable over incentivized decision tasks. Yet, given the relevance of
ambiguity preferences for economic decision-making, we argue that ambiguity preferences should
be measured more often in empirical studies and we provide a toolkit to reliably do so.
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Appendix A: Incentivized tasks
This appendix describes the two incentivized tasks in detail. Before each task, subjects were
presented examples to familiarize with the design of the tasks. In addition, subjects were asked
several control questions to ensure that they understood the payo structure.
Ambiguity task: The task extents the Ellsberg (1961) thought experiment to dierent situ-
ations, similar to Lauriola and Levin (2001) and Butler et al. (2014).
In this task, we present you a decision table with 11 situations. Each situation oers you a
choice between drawing a ball from two dierent urns, urn 1 or urn 2. Both urns contain 10
balls, either white or black.
 Urn 1: The composition of urn 1 changes from one situation to the next. While the
number of balls in one color (e.g., white) increases incrementally from 0 to 10, the
number of balls of the other color (e.g., black) decreases accordingly.
 Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in each situation. However, you don't
know how many balls are white and how many balls are black. Any combination is
possible. There might be from 0 to 10 white balls, with the remaining balls being black.
One ball will be drawn from the urn you choose. The points you can earn depend on the color
of the ball drawn. Only one color yields some points. You can choose whether the color that
yields points is white or black. Please choose the color of the ball that provides you points:
 white
 black
Please look at the decision table below.24 In each of the 11 situations, we would like you to
indicate from which urn (urn 1 or urn 2) you prefer drawing a ball. As explained before, both
urns contain 10 balls, either white or black.
 Urn 1: The composition of urn 1 changes from one situation to the next. The number
of white balls increases incrementally from 0 white balls in situation 0 to 10 white balls
in situation 10, while the number of black balls decreases accordingly.
 Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in all situations. However, the exact
composition of urn 2 is unknown. Any combination of white and black balls is possible:
there might be 10 white balls, or 10 black balls, or any other possible combination of
white and black balls.
If a white ball is drawn, you earn 10 points. If a black ball is drawn, you earn no points.
At the end of the session, the computer will randomly select one out of the 11 situations.
Then, depending on whether you have chosen urn 1 or urn 2 in that situation, the computer
will randomly draw one ball from that urn. Depending on the color of the ball, you earn the
points indicated in the table.25 Notice that even though you will make 11 decisions, only one
of these will determine the points you earn, but you will not know in advance which situation
will be selected (they are equally likely to be selected).
In each situation, from which urn do you prefer to draw a ball, urn 1 or urn 2?
24The actual decision table presented to the subjects depends on the color chosen. In this appendix, we assume
that the selected color is white. If the selected color is black, the word \white" has to be replaced with \black",
and vice versa.
25In practice, the ambiguous urn was lled with 10 balls of the winning color. Of course, this was unknown to
participants.
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Situation URN 1: URN 2: Your choices
If a white ball is drawn If a white ball is drawn
you earn 10 points you earn 10 points
0 0 white balls, 10 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
1 1 white ball, 9 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
2 2 white balls, 8 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
3 3 white balls, 7 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
4 4 white balls, 6 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
5 5 white balls, 5 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
6 6 white balls, 4 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
7 7 white balls, 3 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
8 8 white balls, 2 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
9 9 white balls, 1 black ball unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
10 10 white balls, 0 black balls unknown composition Urn 1   Urn 2
Risk task (Chakravarty and Roy, 2009): This task is taken from decision sheet B of
Chakravarty and Roy (2009).
In this task you need to ll in the decision table shown below. The decision table consists
of 10 dierent situations, listed 1 to 10. Each situation oers you a choice between drawing
a ball from two dierent urns, urn A or urn B. Both urns contain 10 balls, either white or
black.
 The composition of urn A is identical in all 10 situations. There are 5 white balls and
5 black balls.
 The composition of urn B changes from one situation to the next. The number of
white balls increases incrementally from 0 white balls in situation 1 to 9 white balls in
situation 10, while the number of black balls decreases accordingly.
At the end of the session, the computer will randomly select one out of the 10 situations.
Then, depending on whether you have chosen urn A or urn B in that situation, the computer
will randomly draw one ball from that urn. Depending on the color of the ball, you earn the
points indicated in the table. Notice that even though you will make 10 decisions, only one of
these will determine the points you earn, but you will not know in advance which situation
will be selected (they are equally likely to be selected).
In each situation, from which urn do you prefer to draw a ball, urn A or urn B?
Situation URN A: URN B: Your choices
If a white ball is drawn If a white ball is drawn
you earn 6 points you earn 10 points
If a black ball is drawn If a black ball is drawn
you earn 4 points you earn 0 points
1 5 white balls, 5 black balls 0 white balls, 10 black balls Urn A   Urn B
2 5 white balls, 5 black balls 1 white ball, 9 black balls Urn A   Urn B
3 5 white balls, 5 black balls 2 white balls, 8 black balls Urn A   Urn B
4 5 white balls, 5 black balls 3 white balls, 7 black balls Urn A   Urn B
5 5 white balls, 5 black balls 4 white balls, 6 black balls Urn A   Urn B
6 5 white balls, 5 black balls 5 white balls, 5 black balls Urn A   Urn B
7 5 white balls, 5 black balls 6 white balls, 4 black balls Urn A   Urn B
8 5 white balls, 5 black balls 7 white balls, 3 black balls Urn A   Urn B
9 5 white balls, 5 black balls 8 white balls, 2 black balls Urn A   Urn B
10 5 white balls, 5 black balls 9 white balls, 1 black ball Urn A   Urn B
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Appendix B: Non-incentivized thought experiments
Ellsberg urn experiment
Please imagine the following situation: You can choose between drawing a ball from two dierent urns, urn A and
urn B. Urn A contains 100 balls, some are white and some are black. However, you don't know how many balls
are white and how many balls are black. Any combination is possible. There might be from 0 to 100 white balls,
with the remaining balls being black. Urn B contains 100 balls as well, but you know that it contains exactly 50
white balls and 50 black balls. Now choose a color, either white or black. Suppose you win $100 if you draw a ball
of the color you have selected. If the ball is of the other color, you win nothing. From which urn would you prefer
drawing a ball?
1. I have a strong preference to draw a ball from urn A.
2. I have a slight preference to draw a ball from urn A.
3. I am indierent between drawing a ball from urn A or from urn B.
4. I have a slight preference to draw a ball from urn B.
5. I have a strong preference to draw a ball from urn B.
Dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
Please imagine the following situation: You can choose between drawing a ball from two dierent urns, urn A and
urn B. Urn A contains 100 balls, some are white and some are black. However, you don't know how many balls
are white and how many balls are black. Any combination is possible. There might be from 0 to 100 white balls,
with the remaining balls being black. Put dierently, you do not know the probability of drawing a white or a black
ball. Urn B contains 100 balls as well, but you know the exact number of white and black balls in this urn. In
other words, you know the exact probability of drawing a white or a black ball. Now choose a color, either white
or black. Suppose you win $100 if you draw a ball of the color you have selected. If the ball is of the other color,
you win nothing. Please choose the color of the ball that provides you $100:
 white
 black
We present you now several situations.26 The composition of urn A is identical in each situation. The composition
of urn B is dierent in each situation.
1. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 45 white balls and 55
black balls, i.e., there is a 45% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A ! go to situation 2; (b) Urn B ! go to situation 3
2. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 65 white balls and 35
black balls, i.e., there is a 65% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A ! go to situation 4; (b) Urn B ! go to situation 5
3. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 25 white balls and 75
black balls, i.e., there is a 25% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A ! go to situation 6; (b)Urn B ! go to situation 7
4. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 75 white balls and 25
black balls, i.e., there is a 75% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A ! go to situation 8; (b) Urn B ! go to situation 9
5. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 55 white balls and 45
black balls, i.e., there is a 55% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A ! go to situation 10; (b) Urn B ! go to situation 11
26The actual situations presented to the subjects depend on the color chosen. In this appendix, we assume that the
selected color is white. If the selected color is black, the word \white" has to be replaced with \black", and vice versa.
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6. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 35 white balls and 65
black balls, i.e., there is a 35% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A ! go to situation 12; (b) Urn B ! go to situation 13
7. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 15 white balls and 85
black balls, i.e., there is a 15% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A ! go to situation 14; (b) Urn B ! go to situation 15
8. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 80 white balls and 20
black balls, i.e., there is a 80% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A ! go to situation 16; (b) Urn B
9. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 70 white balls and 30
black balls, i.e., there is a 70% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B
10. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 60 white balls and 40
black balls, i.e., there is a 60% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B
11. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 50 white balls and 50
black balls, i.e., there is a 50% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B
12. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 40 white balls and 60
black balls, i.e., there is a 40% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B
13. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 30 white balls and 70
black balls, i.e., there is a 30% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B
14. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 20 white balls and 80
black balls, i.e., there is a 20% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B
15. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 10 white balls and 90
black balls, i.e., there is a 10% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B ! go to situation 17
16. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 90 white balls and 10
black balls, i.e., there is a 90% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a
white ball, and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B
17. What would you prefer? Drawing a ball from urn A with unknown composition, i.e., you do not know the
probability of drawing a white ball or drawing a ball from urn B in which there are 5 white balls and 95 black
balls, i.e., there is a 5% chance of drawing a white ball? Remember, you win $100 if you draw a white ball,
and nothing otherwise. (a) Urn A; (b) Urn B
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Appendix C: Survey questionnaire27
In this part, we present you a list of statements. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with them.
Please do not spend too much time on each statement. There are no right or wrong answers and therefore your
rst response is important. Nevertheless, try to be as honest as you can be. Answer according to your own feelings,
rather than how you think most people would answer. Don't worry about being consistent in your responses. Be
sure to answer every statement.
Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to which you agree or disagree with them on a
scale from 1 (I strongly agree) to 7 (I strongly disagree).
1 There's a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything.
2 Practically every problem has a solution.
3 I have always felt that there is a clear dierence between right and wrong.
4 Nothing gets accomplished in this world unless you stick to some basic rules.
5 If I were a doctor, I would prefer the uncertainties of a psychiatrist to the clear and denite work of
someone like a surgeon or a x-ray specialist.
6 Vague and impressionistic pictures really have little appeal for me.
7 Before an examination, I feel much less anxious if I know how many questions there will be.
8 The best part of a jigsaw puzzle is putting in that last piece.
9 I don't like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility of coming out with a clear-cut and
unambiguous answer.
10 I like to fool around with new ideas, even if they turn out later to be a total waste of time.
11 Perfect balance is the essence of all good composition.
12 An expert who doesn't come up with a denite answer probably doesn't know too much.
13 There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved.
14 A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear.
15 In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than lange
and complicated ones.
16 What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.
17 A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise, really
has a lot to be grateful for.
18 I like parties where I know most of the people more than the ones where all or most of the people
are complete strangers.
27The survey or self-assessment questions to elicit ambiguity preferences are mostly taken from scales in the psychology
literature. Items 1 to 11 are taken from Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale by Kirton (1981) (based on Mac Donald Jr. (1970)
and Rydell and Rosen (1966)); items 12 to 18 from Budner (1962); item 19 from the Tolerance of Ambiguity Scale by
Budner (1962); items 20 to 24 from Ambiguity Tolerance Scale by Norton (1975); items 25 to 28 from the Extended Life
Orientation test by Chang et al. (1997); items 29 to 37 from the Uncertainty Response Scale by Greco and Roger (2001);
items 38 to 41 from the Ambiguity Tolerance Scale II by McLain (2009); item 42 comes from the study by Robins et al.
(2001); items 43 to 46 are own additions. The instructions are taken from psychometric studies, see, e.g., Mac Donald Jr.
(1970).
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19 I would like to live for a while in a foreign country that is new to me.
20 In a decision-making problem in which there is not enough information to process the problem, I feel
very uncomfortable.
21 I am tolerant of ambiguous situations.
22 Vague and impressionistic pictures appeal to me more than realistic pictures.
23 I like movies or stories with denite endings.
24 The best part about reading a poem is then being able to read a commentary explaining the poem's
meanings.
25 In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
26 When I undertake something new, I expect to succeed.
27 If something can go wrong for me, it will.
28 I rarely count on good things happening to me.
29 When making a decision, I am deterred by the fear of making a mistake.
30 When a situation is uncertain, I generally expect the worst to happen.
31 I nd the prospect of change exciting and stimulating.
32 I enjoy unexpected events.
33 The idea of taking a trip to a new country fascinates me.
34 Before making any changes, I need to think things over thoroughly.
35 I feel relieved when an ambiguous situation suddenly becomes clear.
36 When uncertain, I act very cautiously until I have more information about the situation.
37 I prefer to stick to tried and tested ways of doing things.
38 I try to avoid situations that are ambiguous.
39 I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to easily understand.
40 I generally prefer novelty over familiarity.
41 I nd it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain.
42 I have high self-esteem.
43 I like novelties.
44 I voluntarily accept new challenges.
45 When a situation is uncertain, I never take action until I know all the risks involved.
46 Do you consider yourself as a pessimist or an optimist?
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Sample characteristics
Table SM A1 presents the demographic characteristics of the sample.
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Table SM A1: Summary of sample characteristics
Panel A: Gender
Observations Percentage
male 54 44.6%
female 67 55.4%
total 121 100.0%
Panel B: Marital status
Observations Percentage
single 112 92.6%
married 5 4.1%
divorced 3 2.5%
widowed 1 0.8%
total 121 100.0%
Panel C: Age
Observations Percentage
up to 20 years 11 9.1%
21 - 25 years 59 48.8%
26 - 30 years 29 24.0%
over 30 years 22 18.2%
total 121 100.0%
average 121 26.3 years
Panel D: Nationality
Observations Percentage
United Kingdom 45 37.2%
Italy 12 9.9%
Germany 9 7.4%
China 7 5.8%
Poland 6 5.0%
other countries 42 34.7%
total 121 100.0%
Panel E: Main eld of studies
Observations Percentage
Politics and International Relations 14 11.6%
Economics 11 9.1%
Business Studies 10 8.3%
Modern Languages and Cultures 10 8.3%
Psychology 9 7.4%
Development Studies 9 7.4%
Humanities 9 7.4%
other subjects 49 40.5%
total 121 100.0%
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Tests of linearity assumption
The use of Likert scale in regression analysis relies on the assumption of linearity. In this
section, we test this assumption for each selected predictor of the `best' ambiguity module. We
do the test in the following way. We estimate an auxiliary OLS regression treating the set of
\best predictors" as continuous variables entering linearly in the regression specication and,
for each predictor measured on a Likert scale, we add an additional binary indicator for high
response values (that is 5, 6, 7). If the eect of a predictor is indeed non-linear, we expect its
corresponding auxiliary binary indicator to be signicant as it picks up the non-linearity. Table
SM B1 reports these test for the sample including all subjects and table SM B2 for the sample of
consistent subjects (mimicking panels A and B of table 5, respectively). None of these auxiliary
terms is signicant nor they are jointly signicant. In our sample we do not nd evidence of
strong non-linearity in the survey questions measured on Likert scales.
Table SM B1: Test for non-linearity of predictors { all subjects
linear (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dynamic 0.0027*** 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0023*** 0.0025*** 0.0028***
Ellsberg urn (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Item 19 0.0164
(0.011)
Item 1 -0.0177*** -0.0123 -0.0121 -0.0163*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Item 2 0.0184*** 0.0250** 0.0250** 0.0189*
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Item 35 0.0217*** 0.0174* 0.0241**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Item 41 -0.0129** 0.0038
(0.005) (0.011)
Item 19 high -0.0112
(0.056)
Item 1 high -0.0159 -0.0236 -0.0043
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Item 2 high -0.0397 -0.0379 -0.0066
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Item 35 high -0.0136 -0.0258
(0.060) (0.059)
Item 41 high -0.0672
(0.041)
constant 0.3504*** 0.3655*** 0.3363*** 0.3368*** 0.2929*** 0.3015***
(0.041) (0.032) (0.036) (0.042) (0.050) (0.053)
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121
F -statistics 0.04 0.54 0.42 0.83
(non-linear terms = 0)
p-value F -test (0.842) (0.584) (0.740) (0.506)
The variables with sux `high' are auxiliary binary indicator equal to 1 for high response values
(that is 5, 6, 7) and 0 for all other values. If the eect of a predictor is non-linear, the auxiliary
binary indicator would pick up the non-linearity and be signicant. F statistics test the null
hypothesis of joint equality of all auxiliary indicators included in a specication. Coecient
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table SM B2: Test for non-linearity of predictors: consistent subjects
linear (1) (2) (3)
Dynamic 0.0020*** 0.0015** 0.0020***
Ellsberg urn (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Item 1 -0.0129** -0.0116
(0.005) (0.010)
Item 2 0.0161*** 0.0223**
(0.006) (0.010)
Item 19 0.0174* 0.0166
(0.010) (0.010)
Item 1 high -0.0065
(0.039)
Item 2 high -0.0298
(0.044)
Item 19 high -0.0161 -0.0111
(0.055) (0.055)
constant 0.3624*** 0.4077*** 0.3451*** 0.3476***
(0.036) (0.020) (0.035) (0.042)
Observations 116 116 116 116
F -statistics (non-linear terms = 0) 0.08 0.04 0.26
p-value F -test (0.771) (0.838) (0.768)
Notes: See footnotes to Table SM B1 for explanations.
